Paul Storm: At that time, it was the late 1970s. The largest embassies in Guyana were the Soviet, the Communist Chinese, the North Korean, and the Cuban, in that order, and then the US Embassy. So you could imagine that there was a lot of intelligence swirling about, and people would be—because it was off the beaten path—people would do things and make liaisons there that they wouldn’t make in other places.
So the Ambassador would stress quite often how vital this mission was and our embassy there. And in terms of geopolitics, I suppose it was, but I wasn’t involved with all of that.
Dr. Preston Jones: So you’re a junior enlisted soldier, so I wouldn’t expect that you would be in the know about things, but you mentioned these embassies. I was surprised to hear North Korea had an embassy there. Of course, when we think about Jonestown, the whole story of Jonestown, Peoples Temple, the US government, and the relationship between the government and Peoples Temple, one of the questions that arises has to do with the presence of the CIA in Guyana.
I would assume that there’s going to be a CIA presence in Guyana. And as I said, you’re a junior enlisted marine. I don’t expect you’re going to have insider knowledge, but do you recall just being generally aware, given what you just said, of the ambassadors emphasizing the importance of this mission because of geopolitical questions?
Do you remember having some, maybe even vague, awareness of a CIA presence there around the embassy?
Storm: Of course, the stated position of the State Department is they have neither confirmed nor denied whether there’s ever been CIA involvement. I’m not so naive as to expect that the CIA wouldn’t be interested in Guyana, but truth be told, I can’t imagine that they would be all that interested.
The country had no vital interest to the US, relative to other countries, which would be much more vital of interest. The State Department would handle more things about liaisons with other diplomatic personnel. So I don’t think that the CIA would necessarily have had a keen interest in Guyana.
Of course, I have no specific knowledge that there was any CIA presence. I guess if you want to talk about the elephant in the room, I’ve heard rumors and speculations about whether Mr. Dick Dwyer was, and I can’t confirm or deny that. But I see some of the speculations about it and I read them, and I go, “well, these people don’t know what they’re talking about at all.” This is not the man I knew. It doesn’t accord with some of the things I know that are just plain false. I have to leave it at that. I can’t say yes or no.
Jones: But you’re referring to Richard Dwyer, the Deputy Chief of Mission there. We’ll come back and talk about him.
And as you say, there are some questions about whether he was with the CIA.
Storm: I tried to be professional, as the other Marines that I was with tried to be professionals. We recognized that it was not part of our need to know who was sure or was not working in particular functions in the CIA and to speculate would’ve been unproductive and actually counterproductive. I wouldn’t want to know if somebody worked, quite frankly, because it would prevent me from doing my job as well. Remember, my job as a Marine Guard was to protect the embassy and its personnel. If I had some special knowledge that this person is special in some particular way, that might color how I would react and handle particular situations, if you can see what I’m saying.
Jones: That’s true.
Storm: I wouldn’t want that. I would want to be free from that knowledge so I could act in the best interest of everybody.
Jones: You grew up in the Bay Area. Even before you got to Guyana, you had heard of Peoples Temple. Let’s say when you’re in Chile, you’re still doing embassy duty in Chile. You haven’t arrived yet in Guyana, and somehow Peoples Temple comes up. Let’s say you’re at a restaurant and you’re chatting with another Marine, and the Marine says that he saw some newspaper article about this organization in San Francisco called Peoples Temple. Is that going to ring a bell with you at that time? I know that these exercises are a little difficult, especially after decades. But at that time, what do you imagine you would’ve said to the Marine in 1977? Based on just what you’d picked up living in San Francisco about Peoples Temple?
Storm: Oh, well, I would’ve related how I had heard about them from various news accounts growing up in the Bay Area. It was my impression that the Peoples Temple—particularly Jim Jones was politically connected and very politically savvy. My personal assessment at that time would’ve been that I didn’t have any particular high esteem for Mr. Jones, because he came across to me as somewhat phony and as someone who is exploiting other people and their weaknesses for his own personal benefit. So I was never particularly impressed by the man. I can appreciate that he was quite sophisticated and cunning and obviously not unintelligent, but not overly competent either.
Jones: When you went to Guyana in September of 1978, were you aware that Peoples Temple had set up a community in that country?
Storm: I wasn’t aware that they had gone to Guyana. But as soon as I arrived, of course I had heard about them being there because there were 900 Americans in the country. This was something that was of obvious interest to the embassy. We had to be concerned about all Americans in the country, regardless of their particular beliefs and feelings. We had a responsibility as the embassy to look after their best interest, no matter how they would make that for us. That was something that was part of the job.
Jones: How would you describe the general sense within the embassy among the Marines with whom you’re interacting? You overhear things other people say within the embassy. How would you describe the general sense of things within the embassy of Jonestown?
And again, we’re speaking before what happened in mid-November of 1978. What, how generally would you describe the sort of feeling folks had in the embassy about the 900 American community there at Jonestown?
Storm: There was no hostility. If there was anything, there was sadness that we weren’t getting along better. We were all Americans and we respected that we had various opinions and differences of opinions. We wish that we could find a way to make the relationship better with the community there between them.
Jones: Between the embassy and Jonestown?
Storm: Yes. They put forth many outreach efforts towards Jonestown and it and its members at many times. But there was suspicion on their side, understandably or not, and so it made it difficult. But I take a different perspective in that I think that the Embassy staff did their utmost to try to get along and to work with Jonestown and Peoples Temple. But it wasn’t easy. And these I have a high regard for the professionalism of the embassy staff.
I think they did well with what they had to work with. They were doing yeomen’s work. Their hands were tied in many ways because of US State Department policy and the new policies about respecting public privacy were coming into vogue in the late 1970s. So the kinds of things that we could do—plus working within the constraints of the Guyanese Government and the physical logistics of the place—made it that much more difficult. So I think they did some great work. Unfortunately, it didn’t work out well in the end, but they had to work with it, and I think they did a good job.
Jones: You mentioned just the logistical challenges of getting to Jonestown. That is a challenge. The distance and the vast jungle that separates Georgetown from Jonestown. You mentioned a few things that I’d just like to ask about. You mentioned that the embassy staff and all their efforts to build a good relationship with Jonestown seemed like they didn’t succeed. Are you able to remember a particular incident or something that happened that could kind of illustrate that? Or that could just illustrate some event, something that happens that illustrates this tense or not very good relationship between the embassy and Jonestown?
Does anything come to mind that kind of illustrates that or fleshes that out a little bit?
Storm: Sure. For example, there would be agreements reached between embassy staff and Peoples Temple’s representatives to meet on a certain date. These would be canceled at the last minute on the side of Jonestown or if we knew that some of the Peoples Temple members were coming into Georgetown, we’d say, “do you want to meet on these particular days while you’re in town?” Then they would rebuff those and say, “we don’t trust you. We don’t want to talk with you.” Those sort of things.
There were pluses and minuses from the Guyanese perspective too. One, it was a way to prod the US government for more attention by having these dissidents. “Here we are, a poor country, yet we’re taking in these outsiders from the US and so on.” Things like that go along with their whole narrative that they had developed.
Jones: How did what happened at Jonestown happen? How did that first come into your consciousness? When did you first become aware that something significant had happened?
Storm: Well, on the 18th, I was resting in the evening because I knew I was scheduled to have the upcoming midnight shift, which was from the 18th to the 19th.
So the first time I really knew that there was something going on was when I arrived to stand watch that night for that midnight shift. I drove in and walked in, and it was quite apparent that there was all kinds of crazy going on there. The Marine that I was relieving from duty passed on the information that there had been this massacre out at Jonestown during the congressman’s entourage. The embassy was a maelstrom of activity. Normally on the midnight shift, you’re there alone, and you’re taking care of various functions that you have to take care of. But that night everybody was there.
My NCIC was there, embassy staff, the Ambassador, everybody was there—the Public Affairs Officer and so on. And it was just pandemonium-controlled chaos—we were doing triage, as we called it, and so I spent that midnight shift dealing with the events as they came in. What we knew at that point was that there had been the slayings at the airstrip at Port Kaituma.
We had that communication. We were aware that the Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Dwyer, was at Port Kaituma, and he had sent some communications back to the embassy that the congressman had been killed with a number of other people. We knew that. But there were all kinds of things that we did not know at that point.
Rumors were swirling around and so forth. One thing we did know was that there were members of Peoples Temple in Georgetown also. And so because of that, we were at a high level of alert, because we didn’t know if this would be part of a concerted effort to attack American interests regardless of where they were in Georgetown, and whether they might possibly be attacking the embassy.
Jones: That’s what I wanted to ask you. I’ve talked to a Special Forces soldier who arrived in Jonestown very quickly, and he said that when he came in, his assumption going in was that he was heading into a combat situation. He was anticipating being in a firefight.
Did it briefly go through your mind that you, as a Marine, might switch from whatever normal duty is to actual combat? Were you, in your own mind, gearing up for the possibility of that?
Storm: Embassy Marines live with that and their minds constantly. They are trained and constantly prepared for that eventuality. Marines are not an offensive force. They are a reactive force, and we rely on the local government to provide the basic security for the embassy.
Is it in the local populace’s mind to overtake the embassy? Well, they’re going to overtake the embassy. I mean, there’s no question on that. So the Embassy Marines are to primarily focus on protecting the personnel and protecting the assets of the embassy. And it’s a matter of retreat until the situation can be unwound. So we were relying on the local police force to make sure that no one was coming in off the street. Of course we had- within the compound itself—I can’t really go into all the kinds of things that they do in embassies—but the embassy there was not well situated in terms of physical defense.
At that time, the embassy was on Main Street in Guyana. It has since moved to a larger compound, but there were buildings all around it. It was a major thoroughfare. It is just basically a three-story wooden structure. Not the easiest to defend if it had come to that, but truth be told, I didn’t have all that much time to think about that. I was prepared by training to take care of it if it had come up, but I was busy that night with a lot of things.
Jones: How did you spend that evening? So you arrived for duty, and the embassy is in a state of chaos. You used the phrase “you’re in sort of triage,” which I assume means folks in charge of determining what’s the priority and how do we prioritize our responses to what’s going on? What did you do? What did your duty end up being that night?
Storm: Well, part of the normal duties, even after hours, was that the Marines would answer the phones. We had a switchboard behind the receptionist desk. It was an old, 8-line British telecom system. It had little levers on it, so antiquated. It was almost comical. So I would answer the calls. I answered any calls that came into the embassy that evening and various special duties that would pop up at any given time to assist in with the embassy staff and whatever they were doing, we would take care of the NCIC was of course was there, and so he was liaising with the other embassy officials. And then from time to time he’d ask, “do this, do that, do the other.” I would take care of that as quickly as I could. We’re part of the team, so if we’re swamped, “can you go make these copies or something like that?” We’re going to do it because that’s part of the job. And it was pretty much just a whirlwind of activity the whole night. So any pulling out any particular thing and asking if I did that, I don’t know, it’s been four decades since.
Jones: So are you manning—are you spending a good part of that first night then manning the phone or fielding the calls that I imagine are coming in gradually and then a tsunami of calls?
Storm: Well, remember this is 1978. There were no personal computers, and there were no cell phones. It was all landline communications. We were still using teletype terminals. Guyana was pretty backward- and if you ask the common person on the street, “have you heard of Guyana?” They probably haven’t. And you ask them, well, where’s Guyana? They’ll probably say it’s in Africa. This is about as far away psychically as you can get from the outside. So at that time we had, as I recall, they had like one trunk line cable—an undersea cable for the whole country going out.
So just placing a call out in normal times was difficult. That night things were just swamped. Of course, the embassy had its own private channels. But people like the Public Affairs Officer, well, he was on the phone all night with people back in the United States and so forth.
I got many calls from members of the press trying to get through to whoever they could talk to, because even though we had very limited information there, we were local. Back in the United States, it’s like 4 in the morning back on the West Coast, where Peoples Temple was from. And so the press there were trying to get through to Guyana, just dialing through and then getting through, and they didn’t have a clue about what was going on. They were just starving for any information.
Jones: So these journalists—of course, they want to get through to people who are going to be in positions of authority, decision-making positions. But as you’ve indicated, those folks are overwhelmed. Did any of the journalists say, “if I can’t talk to anybody else, I’ll talk to this Marine.” Did you have journalists who wanted to interview you about what you knew?
Storm: Yeah. Yes, I did. I can remember phone calls from several local Bay Area television stations. I had one call from the CBS affiliate, KPIX in San Francisco. And at the time, the PAO Mr. Kibble, was not available.1 He was talking to someone else on another line, and so I explained this to him. The reporter asked to talk to the Ambassador.2 He said, “no, that isn’t happening. Is the PAO there so that I can talk to him?” I said, “he’s on the other line.” He said, “can I put you on hold?” I said, “I can put you on hold, but I can’t tell you whether you’ll lose the connection or not.” And I don’t know how long that’s going to be and he said, “who else is there?” I said, “not really anybody, sir. I mean, we’re pretty swamped here.” He then said, “who are you?” I explained that I’m a Marine Guard. He said, “well, can I talk to you?” I said sure, unless I have something come up that I have to do. I explained to him that I was from the Bay Area and I knew of KPIX because he wanted to know who I was. They didn’t know what was happening. And of course they had a vital interest in finding out, so he tried to ask me questions about what was going on, and I couldn’t say, because one, I didn’t know. And two, I wasn’t authorized to make any kind of statements in any way.
Jones: You said that the embassy was sort of a maelstrom of activity over the first 24 to 48 hours. Do you have a recollection of a lot of people coming into the embassy that you’ve never seen before? Did you have the feeling that a lot of folks were coming in from the outside who were in one way or another, involved in what was unfolding?
Storm: There were a lot of people that were in and out of the embassy that were, yes, not regulars. But those who came in or out were meeting with somebody, and they would come up from the embassy staff and they would be escorted through whatever they did. We didn’t have to sort out whether they should be there or not.
And I don’t know, but I would imagine that a lot of them—the local Guyanese officials were probably in and out, and the non-officials, people from logistic support that were trying to get in, well, you can imagine who was there. We had contingents from you name it, the FBI and State Department officials, the military, and reporters.
You must remember that the embassy there was very small. I mean, if we had 25 people tops before Jonestown, maybe 6 of those are Marines. It is not a lot of people. They had to take care of all of the interests the United States has in Guyana with 25 people. That’s quite a job.
Jones: The experience here in the States is that the first reports come in and the numbers grow. And so the newspaper articles kind of pull numbers out of the air. 300, and then the next day, 400, and then the next day, 600, and the numbers keep going up. Was the experience similar in the embassy that as time goes on, do you just have a recollection of that initially? You know that something happened at the Port Kaituma Airstrip, and then news comes in that something’s happened at Jonestown. And then as folks get in there and they’re dealing with what actually happened, they find we’ve got bodies piled on bodies.
Was that the experience in the embassy, just a gradual—a sense of just the growing magnitude of what had happened in Jonestown?
Storm: Not really. I mean, we knew- the embassy didn’t speculate as to how many or what the tally was in terms of the number of people. They were responsible for finding out, and so that’s what we were focused on- that. It was clear at the beginning. We first only knew about the airstrip and what had happened there. But as soon as anyone got to Jonestown, it was quite apparent that if there were any survivors at all, it was a few that had somehow escaped into the jungle. And the prospects of that—well, we don’t know. We’re not going to speculate. And anyone who did get out into that jungle, what were their prospects of surviving? Within the embassy, I don’t think anyone was surprised that the vast majority of the people in Jonestown were dead.
Jones: You mentioned in something you wrote that you were in the presence of Richard Dwyer, the Deputy Chief of Mission who was wounded there at Port Kaituma. You wrote that you realized, given what he was saying or given what was happening when you were near him, that you were participating in something—these aren’t your exact words—but you were participating in something for the history books you had.
You understood that something was unfolding around you that was going to become part of history. Do you remember what it was, what it said, or that moment that drove that point home to you that this isn’t just a bad day at work, but this is something of historical significance that’s taken place?
Storm: Yes. Well, the circumstances were that after that first night, we were concerned that there might be attacks on the embassy and its personnel. So we initiated bodyguard details for the Ambassador. I was on bodyguard duty on the evening of the 19th, after the midnight shift with the Ambassador. So I was armed to provide personal security for him on that shift, and he went to debrief Mr. Dwyer at his home.
I didn’t have to come to the realization. It was pretty well obvious that this was a historic time. At that time we already knew the following: we knew that a congressman, a US congressman, had been shot and killed—the only one ever killed in the performance of his congressional duties. There were other casualties in the press, and there were an untold number of others that were expected to be dead in Jonestown. I was on bodyguard duty with the Ambassador, so it was pretty obvious that this was not—this was a historic time, but remember, I was 21 years old.
I just turned 21 a couple months before that. And I was with the Ambassador. We went to Mr. Dwyer’s house and he had just gotten back from Jonestown. He had had a visit from a nurse that was next door. He still had the bullet in him. And he was debriefing and telling the Ambassador what had transpired. He’d remembered the entire previous night taking care of things at Port Kaituma. I mean, he still had a bullet in him. He was drugged up, so we kept it as brief as possible. The Ambassador kept it as brief as possible, but I’m sitting here on the sofa listening to it.
I’m going, thinking to myself, this is mind-blowing. What am I doing here? Well, that is the word that was in my mind.
Jones: I was going to ask you, did it seem surreal that you’re at the home of a guy who’s an important figure in the embassy? You say he’s got a bullet in him and he has just come from this experience and here he is debriefing. Now you said that he was drugged a bit. I imagine that was for the pain or something.
Storm: Antibiotics.
Jones: I mean, how would you describe his own demeanor? By 1978, I think he had had a pretty extensive career and had been to a lot of places in the world. How would you describe him? How did he come across to you?
Storm: Well, it was typical of his character. He was a consummate professional. In my opinion, he wanted to help despite what he was personally going through, and he thought it was important to talk with the Ambassador as soon as he could and to tell him as much information as he could and as quickly as possible.
Jones: You mentioned in something you’ve written that some audiotapes were brought to the embassy and they were brought in a body bag because that was what was available to bring the tapes in. What do you recall about that?
Storm: Yes. I believe it was on the 20th, although I’m not sure of the date, after the evening visiting Mr. Dwyer. I was back on duty in the embassy at Post 1, which is at the front entrance of the embassy. I walked to a US government official and he was carrying a body bag—a canvas body bag. And he sees me on the posts. He said, “hang on to this. I’ll be back for it. And don’t mention it. Don’t tell anybody about it. Keep it calm.”
And so I put it behind the post and I could see that inside it was open. There were boxes for open reels of audiotape, reel-to-reel tape, and audiotape. But I could also detect the strong odor of the body bag having been used, and it had the odor of a decomposed body. For anyone who’s ever had occasion for smelling something like that—this is one more thing on the list. I want to get this thing out here as soon as I can, quite frankly. But while I’m standing there, anyone walking into the front door of the embassy could smell this powerful, overpowering odor. And some of them had a quizzical comment, and some didn’t comment and walked on through. But others would ask, “what’s the smell?” You can’t say anything because you don’t want to call attention to the fact that there’s something here and they don’t have a need to know. And it’ll make my job harder if people know that this thing was here.
Because suppose something’s come up and I got whatever, and now people know this thing is here, I have to take special care to protect it until this guy comes back to get it. So I had to pretty much stand pretending I didn’t know what was going on while people were filing in. Fortunately, the guy came back for the bag after only a short while—maybe 10 or 20 minutes.
Jones: So he told you, “don’t tell anybody about the bag.” I was curious about that. You had written that you as people are asking about that smell, and that you pretended not to know what they were talking about. So what I’m hearing now is that the reason you did that is because this guy said don’t tell anybody about it.
Storm: I don’t know if he explicitly said that. I know he said, “hey, you hang on to this.” But the implication was there that this is sensitive stuff. He wouldn’t have had to have told me. I would’ve picked up on it and would’ve kept this on the down low. It is on a need-to-know basis. People don’t need to know about this, and that’s the way I handled it.
Jones: So you’re acting in a very professional way. How would you describe the impact of all of this on you? I guess there are two parts to that question. One is immediately when you show up for work, just assuming that it’s going to be a night shift, like the previous night shift and everything has been overturned. And now you realize that you’re part of this huge story that’s unfolding, one that people are still going to be talking about decades later and making documentaries about decades later, and you’re conducting yourself in a very professional way.
But how did all of this impact you as an individual? Let’s say a few days go by, your shift is over, you are by yourself now, and you’re beginning that process of working through all this stuff. In your mind, what was the impact on you in the short term? And then I’m also interested in how all of this has lived with you since. How did it impact you in the short term?
Storm: In the short term, it was a lot of extra work because we immediately went on to double shifts. We were 8 on, 8 off, 8 on, and 8 off for a couple of weeks, which is tiring and exhausting. You could only do that so long and we were in urgent mode. We had urgent things to take care of, so we focused on that and set aside for reflection later about other things.
For example, in all of this activity, I didn’t contact my parents for about a week. Afterwards, my mom called me because she was worried about what’s going on. And I talked to her. I had asked one of the reporters on the phone if he could contact my parents, because I knew how bad communications were. Unfortunately, he hadn’t done that. So personal things were put aside. That was compartmentalized; you have to focus on the job.
But as time went on and I had time to reflect personally, I became more convinced that people need to be dealt with compassionately and to be given the benefit of the doubt. You don’t know what someone’s gone through, and you don’t know why they’re acting in a particular way. I don’t assume that people are, even if somebody slights me in some way or does me wrong. Because of things that happened then and other things in life, I have just come to the realization that it’s probably not because of me; it’s probably because of something they’re dealing with. I try to give the same kind of leeway that I would hope to have. It makes me more empathetic with other people, I would say.
Jones: It sounds like you’re describing a kind of grace—cutting other people’s slack. Here’s how I’m interpreting what you’re saying, and then I’m interested in hearing your response. In the immediate aftermath of Jonestown. I have a recollection of this just as a kid and picking things up on tv. The impression I had as a kid listening to newscasts and things was that these were brainwashed automatons- human but not quite. I know that there’s resistance in communities to having their bodies buried in certain American communities. There’s this sense of these crazed Kool-Aid drinkers in Jonestown. That’s sort of the idea. And then what you do is you actually watch the video and you listen to the tapes and you read what a lot of these folks wrote. And what you find out is that they’re human beings. The people you actually meet don’t fit the description of what I as a kid had in my mind, based on what I was picking up from news reports. Is that what you’re saying? Just the recognition that it’s important to cut people slack because we don’t know what it was that attracted them to this movement.
We don’t know what the psychological conditions were that got them into this situation to a certain degree. And also we don’t know that had we been in the same conditions, in the same context, we can’t be sure that we would not have done the exact same thing because, after all, we’re pretty much like they were as human beings.
And that’s where the sense of grace comes from. So I just threw a lot at you, but that’s my interpretation of what you said. Does that fit with what you’re thinking?
Storm: Yeah, a lot of what you were describing is—I agree with a lot of those things. I think that I mostly feel sadness at the loss, and I try to ask myself, “what can I learn from this to prevent others from making similar mistakes?” I can’t change what happened. So second best is what we can do to salvage what we can from lessons we can learn from this. There’s a lot more compassion needed than what goes around. That’s for sure.
Jones: There’s that phrase, and I saw you responded to it when I referred to this idea of drinking the Kool-Aid and I think it’s a trivial thing, but it’s Flavor-Aid actually. It’s not Kool-Aid. That’s a trivial point, but that phrase is around, but I think each day that goes by fewer and fewer people really get the reference.
It’s just become a phrase, “don’t drink the Kool-Aid.” But you’re among the small number of people in the world who have a pretty close sense of what that phrase is about. And of course there are other people who have a much closer sense. You’re a Marine at the embassy, so there’s some distance, but compared to the vast majority of us, you’re much closer than the overwhelming majority of us. When you hear that phrase, does it not bother you at all? Or does it bother you when you hear people use that phrase?
Storm: Well, yes. But later in life I became a public school teacher and during history classes at high schools, when the people use it or when I’m talking with grownups and they come up and use that expression of Kool-Aid drinkers, I’ve been able to use that as an opportunity to share with them and overcome some of the ignorance about it. Flavor Aid, which is, of course, I think you and I both know that it was Flavor Aid, not Kool-Aid. Yeah. They weren’t Kool-Aid drinkers at all at Jonestown, because remember that there were many of the victims there—and I use the word victim, because these were really victims, especially the children who were not voluntarily drinking this. They were given this by those that they trusted, and in some cases, their own parents.
So it’s rather callous to describe all of the victims of Jonestown and put them in with those few true believers who voluntarily took it upon themselves to commit suicide because there were enormous amounts of coercion and some that were completely involuntary or incapable of giving consent. It’s a disparagement to their memory to talk about it that way. And I can’t blame the vast majority of people who are ignorant of those things, and I wouldn’t want to. I’d rather just take the opportunity to educate them.
Contextual Notes